but the Minorities at Risk data is aggregated annually to only show the most serious incident of rebellion and incident protest during that year. Additionally, the data did not account for the time during the year when the incident occurred; it only showed that something happened, at some time, in that year. To fix these two problems we recoded the data for the years 2004 through 2006 on a monthly scale. Each incident was coded based on intensity in the month that it occurred, so if multiple incidents happened in the same year they will be detected since the data is disaggregated by month. To disaggregate the data, we relied on coding notes of previous researchers and open-source data from international media and government sources [5].

The purpose of this paper is to look only at the frequency of incident occurrences; therefore, for the statistical analysis the data was recoded to a simple count of how many protests or rebellions occurred each year. The statistical analysis, therefore, will not determine which months are statistically different from others. This analysis is not relevant to the present study because the Minorities at Risk data is from countries around the world, and monthly data on relevant variables that would account for difference from month to month are not included in the analysis. The disaggregation of the data into months serves our goal of observing differences of frequencies of unrest occurrence (whether it be a rebellion or a protest) between three different types of democracies.

Three main types of democracies were identified for comparison in this study: transitionally democratic countries, consolidating democracies, and consolidated democracies. To classify the democracies the Polity IV data was used from the Integrated Network for Social Conflict Research. This data assigns a number between zero and ten to countries based on various factors that are observable in democracies. A country with a score of zero is a country with a comparable amount of authoritarian and democratic characteristics, and countries with a score of ten are considered very democratic. It was decided to identify democracy types by assigning countries with scores of zero through three as transitionally democratic, four through seven as consolidating democracies, and eight through ten as consolidated democracies. This method was used to define where transitional democracies fall in terms of answering the research question (do transitional democracies differ in terms of conflict?). Dividing the countries into these three groups was also done for the practical purpose of facilitating the statistical analysis.

To determine statistical significance, the mean frequencies of protests in transitionally democratic countries (category 1) was compared to consolidating democracies (category 2) and then to consolidated democracies (category 3) using a two-sample t-test. Then category 2 was compared to category 3 using a two-sample t-test. The same method was used to compare the mean frequencies of rebellions between the three types of democracies. It was necessary to use the t-tests to test the null hypotheses that there is no statistically significant difference between transitional, consolidating, and consolidated democracies with respect to their frequencies of protests and then with respect to their frequencies of rebellions. The results of these six tests are two fold: they will tell us if protests and rebellions are of equal importance and if so, between which types of democracies are they statistically significant. In other words, it will tell us if democracies with differing levels of freedom and rights have more or less incidents of non-violence and violence.

**DATA ANALYSIS**

Figure 1, below, shows the variation in frequency of protests and rebellions (respectively) over the period January 2004 through December 2006. Results of a statistical test on data from Figure 1 is presented in Table 1. These statistical values show that there is no statistically significant correlation between regime type and frequency of protest for all categories; therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. In terms of rebellion we do observe a statistical correlation between regime type and frequency of rebellion. Based on the analysis, category one is statistically different from the other categories with regard to rebellion; however category three is not different from category two. In relation to our hypothesis, this analysis provides some unexpected results. The tests show no statistically significant correlation between protests and regime type; therefore, it disproves our hypothesis that protests will be more intense in consolidated democracies. In terms of rebellion, the correlation between regime type and frequency of unrest is seen in category one (newly democratic countries). This shows support for our hypothesis, supporting our argument that newly democratic governments possess destabilizing characteristics that make them less stable and more prone to internal rebellions.

Based on the statistically significant correlation observed between rebellion and regime type in category 1 countries, our hypothesis in regards to frequency of rebellion is supported by the data. Table 2 shows that transitional democracies have a much higher mean frequency of rebellion than either consolidating democracies or consolidated democracies.

**IMPLICATIONS**

The existence, or non-existence, of a correlation between minority protest and rebellion and regime type has wide-ranging implications for all countries on the continuum of transitional to consolidated democracies. From a Western perspective, drawing empirical conclusions about the frequency of protest and rebellion in transitional democracies is crucial. The Western world largely seeks to bring democracy to countries that have yet to achieve this ideal, and the ability to anticipate the trajectory of the democratization process is a necessity for policy makers. Even though our theory that consolidated democracies will have a higher frequency of non-violent protest was not borne out in the data, useful conclusions can be drawn from this portion of the study.

At first glance one might interpret the lack of a statistically significant correlation between regime type